How Non-Agency MBS and CMO Fraud Costs Retirees Their Life Savings — And How to Fight Back
If your broker or financial advisor recommended mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) for your retirement portfolio, you may have been the victim of investment fraud. These complex, high-risk products were designed for Wall Street institutions—not for retirees seeking stable income. Yet brokers continue to sell them to conservative investors, often misrepresenting the risks, hiding the fees, and pocketing outsized commissions in the process.
The mortgage-backed securities market exceeds $13 trillion, but the vast majority of it is institutional. When individual investors—especially retirees—are steered into non-agency MBS and exotic CMO tranches, the results can be devastating. Losses of 50%, 70%, even more than 100% of the original investment (when margin is involved) are well-documented in regulatory enforcement actions.
Attorney Robert Wayne Pearce has more than 45 years of experience representing investors in FINRA arbitration and securities litigation. His firm has recovered over $185 million for defrauded investors nationwide, including awards involving complex structured mortgage products. If you lost money in MBS or CMOs that were unsuitable for your investment objectives, you may be entitled to recover your losses.
Free Consultation: Discuss Your MBS Losses With an Experienced Securities Attorney
If you or a loved one suffered losses in mortgage-backed securities, CMOs, or other complex structured products, contact the Law Offices of Robert Wayne Pearce, P.A. for a free, no-obligation consultation. Call (561) 338-0037 or visit secatty.com to discuss your case.
What Are Mortgage-Backed Securities?
A mortgage-backed security is an investment product created by pooling hundreds or thousands of residential mortgage loans into a single security. When homeowners make their monthly mortgage payments—principal and interest—those cash flows pass through to MBS investors. In theory, this creates a bond-like income stream backed by real estate. In practice, the risks are far more complex than most retail investors are told.
There are two fundamentally different categories of MBS, and the distinction between them is critical for understanding investor risk.
Agency MBS vs. Non-Agency (Private-Label) MBS
Agency MBS are issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored entities: Ginnie Mae (backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government), Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac. These securities carry minimal credit risk because the government or GSE guarantees timely payment of principal and interest, even if borrowers default. The agency MBS market exceeds $11 trillion in outstanding balance and trades in a highly liquid, standardized forward market. Agency MBS are the bedrock of the U.S. housing finance system.
Non-agency (private-label) MBS carry no government guarantee whatsoever. They are issued by investment banks—Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Wells Fargo Securities, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, and others—and contain loans that fail to meet agency standards: jumbo mortgages, Alt-A loans, subprime loans, and non-qualified mortgages (non-QM). The non-agency market totals approximately $1.2 trillion outstanding, and issuance more than doubled from roughly $65 billion in 2023 to an estimated $132 billion in 2024. Investors in non-agency MBS bear the full credit risk of borrower defaults with no government safety net.
| Feature | Agency MBS | Non-Agency MBS |
| Guarantee | Government-backed (explicit for Ginnie Mae; implicit for Fannie/Freddie) | None |
| Credit Risk | Minimal to zero | Significant—depends on underlying loan quality |
| Underlying Loans | Conforming: meet strict size, credit, and DTI standards | Non-conforming: jumbo, subprime, Alt-A, non-QM |
| Liquidity | Very high (standardized TBA market) | Limited, dealer-dependent, wide bid-ask spreads |
| Market Size | ~$11+ trillion outstanding | ~$1.2 trillion outstanding |
MBS are not FDIC insured. The FDIC has stated that deposit insurance does not cover investments, even those purchased at an insured bank. This distinction matters because MBS and CMOs are sometimes sold by brokers operating within bank branches, creating dangerous confusion. The agency guarantee protects against borrower default—not against market value losses from interest rate changes, prepayment risk, or liquidity risk. SIPC coverage (up to $500,000) protects only against broker-dealer failure, not investment losses.
What Is a Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO)?
A collateralized mortgage obligation takes mortgage pool cash flows and redistributes them into multiple tranches—French for “slices”—using a waterfall structure. In the simplest sequential-pay CMO, all tranches receive interest payments, but all principal payments flow to Tranche A first until it is fully retired, then to Tranche B, then C, and so on. This creates tranches with progressively longer maturities and dramatically different risk profiles.
More complex CMO structures include PAC (Planned Amortization Class) tranches designed for more predictable cash flows, TAC (Targeted Amortization Class) tranches, and companion or support tranches that absorb excess prepayment variability to protect the PAC tranches. The most dangerous tranches for retail investors are the exotic derivatives created from this slicing process.
The High-Risk CMO Tranches That Harm Retirees
While some CMO tranches are relatively straightforward, others are among the most volatile and complex instruments in the fixed-income universe. These exotic tranches are the ones most frequently mis-sold to conservative retail investors.
Z-Tranches (Accrual Bonds)
Z-tranches sit at the bottom of the CMO waterfall. They receive no cash flows—neither interest nor principal—until all other tranches above them are fully retired. Instead, interest accrues and compounds, added to the principal balance like a zero-coupon bond. A $10 million Z-tranche at 5% deferred for 10 years could grow to approximately $16.45 million through compounding. The accrued interest is redirected to pay down senior tranches faster.
For retirees, Z-tranches present multiple dangers. They have extreme interest rate sensitivity and very long duration, causing severe market value volatility. Investors face “phantom income” taxation—owing taxes on accrued interest they have not actually received. During the 1994 interest rate spike, Z-tranches experienced devastating extension risk as prepayments slowed, extending durations and causing significant losses. A 70-year-old investor placed in a Z-tranche that may not begin paying for 10 to 20 years faces an obvious time-horizon mismatch that any competent advisor should recognize as unsuitable.
Inverse Floaters
Inverse floaters pay interest that moves inversely to a benchmark rate (historically LIBOR, now typically SOFR). A “3× levered” inverse floater might have a coupon formula of 24% minus 3×SOFR. When rates fall, the coupon rises dramatically. When rates rise, the coupon collapses toward zero, and the leveraged structure amplifies losses by a factor of three or more. FINRA has described inverse floaters as among the most volatile and risky CMO tranches available.
In a well-documented FINRA enforcement case, brokers at a Boca Raton brokerage office sold inverse floaters to couples with no prior investment experience, falsely claiming they “could not lose principal” and were “risk free.” Each couple invested $50,000. With margin borrowing of approximately $100,500, they purchased inverse floaters. Ten months later, they had earned $3,688 in interest, paid $6,848 in margin costs, and realized a loss of $70,022—exceeding their entire principal investment. The brokers were permanently barred or suspended from the industry.
Interest-Only (IO) and Principal-Only (PO) Strips
IO strips receive only the interest portion of mortgage payments. They exhibit negative effective duration—their value moves opposite to most bonds. When rates fall and prepayments surge, IO values decline sharply as the interest stream evaporates. PO strips receive only principal payments at a deep discount to face value and have extremely high positive duration. Both are used by institutions as hedging tools but are counterintuitive and dangerous for retail investors seeking stable income.
Five Risks Your Broker May Not Have Disclosed
Non-agency MBS and complex CMOs expose investors to a combination of risks that can interact in unpredictable ways. Under FINRA rules and Regulation Best Interest, your broker or financial advisor was required to explain all of these risks before recommending the investment. If they failed to do so, that failure may form the basis for an investment fraud or negligence claim.
1. Credit Risk
Non-agency MBS carry no government backing. If borrowers default, investors absorb losses starting with the most junior tranche. During the 2008 financial crisis, even “AAA-rated” non-agency tranches experienced catastrophic losses, proving that credit ratings were unreliable. Agency MBS effectively eliminate this risk through government guarantees—which is precisely why non-agency MBS should never be presented as comparable in safety.
2. Prepayment Risk (Contraction Risk)
When interest rates fall, homeowners refinance their mortgages, returning principal to MBS investors sooner than expected. Investors must then reinvest that principal at lower prevailing rates. For investors who paid above par value for their MBS, each dollar of prepaid principal also generates a direct loss.
3. Extension Risk
The mirror image of prepayment risk: when rates rise, homeowners stop refinancing, prepayments slow dramatically, and MBS investors are stuck holding below-market-rate investments far longer than expected. For a 30-year mortgage pool with an expected average life of 7 years, extension risk could push the effective holding period to 15 or 20 years. For retirees, capital becomes locked in underperforming investments precisely when they may need liquidity or higher income.
4. Liquidity Risk
FINRA has acknowledged that while there is a sizable secondary market for CMOs generally, there is less of a market for the more risky and complex tranches. CMOs are less uniform than traditional mortgage-backed securities and more expensive to trade. Non-agency MBS liquidity is particularly limited. If an investor needs to sell, they face wide bid-ask spreads and potentially devastating losses.
5. Complexity Risk
FINRA classifies asset-backed securities as complex products where it would be unreasonable to expect an average retail investor to understand the features and how they interact to produce a return. CMO prospectuses run hundreds of pages. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has concluded that CMOs require bond-by-bond cash flow analysis to fully understand their risks. If your broker cannot explain the product in plain terms, it is almost certainly unsuitable for a retail investor.
Were You Told MBS Were “Safe” or “Like a CD”?
FINRA Rule 2216 specifically prohibits comparing CMOs to bank certificates of deposit. If your broker used safety claims to sell you MBS or CMOs, that misrepresentation may entitle you to full recovery of your losses. Contact Attorney Robert Wayne Pearce at (561) 338-0037 for a free consultation.
Who Sells These Products to Retail Investors—And Why
CMOs and non-agency MBS were originally designed for sophisticated institutional investors—pension funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds. Over time, the securities industry aggressively expanded marketing to retail investors. Today, these products are sold by full-service broker-dealers such as Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Wealth Management, UBS Financial Services, Wells Fargo Advisors, Edward Jones, Raymond James, and LPL Financial, among others. Regional and independent broker-dealers also distribute these products, as do bank-affiliated brokers operating within bank branches.
Brokers face significant conflicts of interest when recommending MBS and CMOs. They typically earn higher commissions on complex products than on simple bonds or index funds. Broker-dealers holding illiquid CMO positions in their own inventory have incentives to offload those positions onto retail customers. Bond trading occurs over-the-counter, where broker profit comes from markups embedded invisibly in the price. Academic research from UC Berkeley found that after FINRA mandated markup disclosure on same-day bond trades, markups fell by 5%—confirming that brokers had been systematically overcharging. Separate research found that retail buyers of investment-grade bonds paid approximately four times more in transaction costs than institutional traders.
These conflicts of interest may give rise to claims for breach of fiduciary duty, failure to supervise, and lack of diversification when brokers concentrate retiree portfolios in complex MBS products to generate higher fees.
Recent Enforcement Actions Confirm Ongoing MBS Fraud
Regulators have continued to uncover MBS and CMO fraud well past the 2008 financial crisis. The following enforcement actions demonstrate that misconduct involving mortgage-backed products remains an active area of SEC and DOJ enforcement.
SEC vs. Macquarie Investment Management — $79.8 Million (2024)
In September 2024, the SEC charged Macquarie Investment Management Business Trust (MIMBT) with fraud involving approximately 4,900 largely illiquid CMOs held across 20 advisory accounts, including 11 retail mutual funds. The SEC found that from January 2017 through April 2021, MIMBT purchased thousands of smaller “odd lot” CMO positions trading at a discount but valued them using prices intended for larger institutional lots, systematically inflating valuations. When overvaluations created problems, MIMBT arranged 465 unlawful cross trades between accounts, often at above-market prices, causing retail mutual fund investors to absorb losses. The SEC imposed a $70 million civil penalty plus $9.8 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest.
DOJ vs. UBS AG — $1.435 Billion (2023)
In August 2023, UBS agreed to pay $1.435 billion to resolve DOJ charges that the bank knowingly made false and misleading statements to purchasers of residential MBS about the quality of underlying mortgage loans in 40 RMBS issued in 2006 and 2007. UBS had conducted due diligence revealing significant loan deficiencies but made representations contradicting its own knowledge. This case brought total civil penalties collected by the DOJ’s RMBS Working Group to over $36 billion across all institutions—including Bank of America ($16.65 billion), JPMorgan Chase ($13 billion), Citigroup ($7 billion), Deutsche Bank ($7.2 billion), Goldman Sachs ($5+ billion), and Credit Suisse ($5.28 billion).
UBS/Credit Suisse Consumer Relief Resolution — $300 Million (2025)
In August 2025, UBS paid $300 million to resolve outstanding consumer relief obligations inherited from Credit Suisse’s 2017 RMBS settlement. Credit Suisse had knowingly purchased and securitized poor-quality mortgage loans and misrepresented risks to investors during 2005–2007. UBS assumed these liabilities through its 2023 emergency acquisition of Credit Suisse.
These enforcement actions confirm that MBS fraud is not a relic of the 2008 financial crisis. The Macquarie case, in particular, involved CMO overvaluation that harmed retail mutual fund investors as recently as 2021—the exact type of misconduct that can affect individual investors holding CMO positions in their brokerage accounts.
The Regulatory Framework Protecting MBS Investors
Multiple layers of federal regulation govern how brokers and financial advisors may sell MBS and CMOs to retail investors. Violations of these rules can serve as the foundation for FINRA arbitration claims seeking recovery of investment losses.
FINRA Rule 2216: The CMO-Specific Rule
FINRA maintains a dedicated rule specifically governing communications about CMOs with the public. Rule 2216 requires that all retail communications include the full term “Collateralized Mortgage Obligation,” prohibits comparing CMOs to bank certificates of deposit, requires disclosure that government backing (for agency CMOs) applies only to the face value of the securities and not to any premium paid, and mandates disclosure that yield and average life will fluctuate with changes in prepayment rates and interest rates. Critically, before selling a CMO to any non-institutional investor, a member firm must offer educational material covering CMO structure, tranche types, risks, the relationship between mortgage loans and mortgage securities, and questions an investor should ask before investing.
FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-03: Heightened Supervision for Complex Products
Published in January 2012 and still the foundational guidance on complex product sales, Notice 12-03 requires firms to implement heightened supervisory and compliance procedures before recommending complex products. The notice explicitly lists securitized products, including asset-backed securities, as examples. Under this guidance, firms should consider whether less complex products could achieve the same investment objectives, consider prohibiting complex product recommendations to accounts not approved for options trading, and consider imposing investment concentration limitations.
Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI)
Effective since June 30, 2020, Regulation Best Interest imposes four obligations on broker-dealers making recommendations: disclosure of material facts about the relationship and conflicts, a care obligation requiring the broker to understand both the product and the customer and to consider reasonably available alternatives, a conflict of interest obligation, and a compliance obligation. The SEC’s April 2023 Staff Bulletin on Care Obligations specifically addresses complex and risky products: while Reg BI does not prohibit recommending them, the financial professional must have a reasonable basis to believe the product is in the customer’s best interest, and firms should consider documenting the reasoning behind complex product recommendations.
SEC FY 2026 Examination Priorities
The SEC’s FY 2026 Examination Priorities, published in November 2025, explicitly target structured products, complex products, illiquid products, and products with complex fee structures under Regulation Best Interest retail sales practice examinations. Fixed-income trading practices—including pricing and valuation of illiquid instruments—are a standing priority. The SEC also emphasizes recommendations to older investors and those saving for retirement. MBS and CMOs fall squarely within multiple targeted examination categories.
Recovering MBS Losses Through FINRA Arbitration
Most brokerage account agreements require investors to resolve disputes through FINRA arbitration rather than court litigation. While this process has important differences from traditional litigation, it provides a viable path for investors to recover losses caused by unsuitable MBS and CMO recommendations.
FINRA’s arbitration statistics demonstrate the scope of securities disputes. In 2025, FINRA received 2,597 new arbitration filings. The most common claim types—breach of fiduciary duty (1,162 cases), negligence (1,113), failure to supervise (1,022), misrepresentation (1,015), and suitability violations (786)—are all directly relevant to MBS and CMO fraud claims. Notably, claims citing Regulation Best Interest violations have surged from just 40 cases in 2021 to 528 in 2025, reflecting growing enforcement of the care and conflict obligations that apply to complex product sales. Approximately 84% of customer arbitration cases close through settlement or paid damages, and the mediation settlement rate reached 87% in 2024.
Common legal theories in MBS arbitration claims include unsuitability (the investment was inappropriate for the customer’s age, risk tolerance, income needs, or investment objectives), misrepresentation or omission of material facts about risks, failure to supervise (the brokerage firm failed to oversee the broker’s recommendations), breach of fiduciary duty, overconcentration (too much of the portfolio was placed in a single product type), and violations of FINRA Rule 2216 and Regulation Best Interest.
Time Limits Apply to MBS Fraud Claims
FINRA arbitration claims are generally subject to a six-year eligibility rule from the date of the event giving rise to the dispute. If you suffered MBS or CMO losses, do not delay. Contact Attorney Robert Wayne Pearce at (561) 338-0037 to evaluate whether your claim is still eligible.
Red Flags: How to Identify an Unsuitable MBS Recommendation
Investors and their families should watch for these warning signs that an MBS or CMO recommendation may have been unsuitable or fraudulent:
Safety Claims
Any representation that CMOs are “safe,” “can’t lose principal,” or are “like a CD” is a serious red flag. FINRA Rule 2216 specifically prohibits comparing CMOs to bank certificates of deposit. FINRA enforcement cases have specifically cited these misrepresentations as the basis for sanctions and bars.
Portfolio Concentration
A disproportionate percentage of a retiree’s portfolio placed in MBS or CMOs violates basic diversification principles. FINRA Notice 12-03 recommends concentration limits for complex products. In a 2024 enforcement action, FINRA cited concentrations of at least 25% in a single complex product as a supervisory failure.
Time-Horizon Mismatch
Selling Z-tranches or long-duration CMOs to elderly investors who need current income is a clear suitability violation. FINRA Regulatory Notice 07-43 specifically highlights that certain products or strategies pose risks that may be unsuitable for many seniors because of time-horizon considerations.
Missing Disclosures
If your broker failed to explain prepayment risk, extension risk, credit risk, or that the product is not FDIC insured, they may have violated both FINRA Rule 2216 and Regulation Best Interest’s disclosure obligation.
Use of Margin
Using margin (borrowed money) to purchase CMOs dramatically amplifies risk. As the FINRA enforcement case involving inverse floaters demonstrated, leveraged CMO positions can produce total losses exceeding the investor’s entire principal investment.
No Written Rationale
Under Reg BI, firms should document why a complex product recommendation is in a customer’s best interest, including consideration of less complex alternatives. FINRA has stated that the extent to which a firm needs to evidence suitability generally depends on the complexity of the security. If no written rationale exists, the recommendation may be indefensible.
MBS Fraud and Elder Financial Abuse
The sale of complex, unsuitable MBS and CMO products to elderly investors may constitute elder financial abuse. Retirees living on fixed incomes are particularly vulnerable because they cannot recover from significant investment losses through future earnings, they often rely on their investment portfolios for daily living expenses, and they may place undue trust in financial professionals who present themselves as advisors acting in the client’s interest.
FINRA has taken enforcement action against advisors who recommended unsuitable complex mortgage-backed products to elderly clients. In one notable case, FINRA suspended and fined an LPL Financial advisor for recommending an unsuitable, complex mortgage-backed security to a 95-year-old client. FINRA Rules 2165 and 4512 provide additional protections for senior investors, including allowing firms to place temporary holds on disbursements when financial exploitation is suspected.
If you believe an elderly family member was sold unsuitable MBS or CMOs, you may have claims for both securities fraud and elder financial abuse. Attorney Robert Wayne Pearce has extensive experience representing seniors and their families in these cases.
Frequently Asked Questions About Mortgage-Backed Securities
What is the difference between agency MBS and non-agency (private-label) MBS?
Agency MBS are issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored entities—Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac—and carry minimal credit risk because the government or GSE guarantees timely payment. Non-agency (private-label) MBS are issued by investment banks, carry no government guarantee, and contain non-conforming loans such as jumbo mortgages, subprime loans, and non-qualified mortgages. Investors in non-agency MBS bear the full credit risk of borrower defaults.
What is a CMO tranche, and why does the tranche type matter?
A CMO tranche is a “slice” of a mortgage pool’s cash flows with a specific risk and return profile. Sequential-pay tranches receive principal in order (A first, then B, then C). PAC (Planned Amortization Class) tranches offer more predictable cash flows but are supported by companion tranches that absorb excess variability. The tranche type determines the level of risk: senior tranches have shorter durations and lower risk, while junior and exotic tranches (Z-tranches, inverse floaters, IO/PO strips) carry dramatically higher risk. The tranche an investor holds can mean the difference between modest returns and total loss.
What is a Z-tranche, and why is it dangerous for retirees?
A Z-tranche (or accrual bond) receives no cash payments—neither interest nor principal—until all senior tranches are retired. Interest accrues and compounds, similar to a zero-coupon bond. This means a retiree could wait 10 to 20 years before receiving any income. Z-tranches have extreme interest rate sensitivity and very long duration, causing severe price volatility. Investors also owe taxes on accrued interest they have not actually received (“phantom income”). For any investor who needs current income, a Z-tranche is almost certainly unsuitable.
What is an inverse floater CMO?
An inverse floater is a CMO tranche whose coupon rate moves in the opposite direction of prevailing interest rates, often with built-in leverage. For example, a 3× levered inverse floater might pay 24% minus 3 times the benchmark rate. When rates rise, the coupon collapses and losses are amplified by the leverage factor. FINRA has described inverse floaters as among the most volatile and risky CMO tranches. FINRA enforcement actions have documented cases where investors lost more than their entire principal investment in leveraged inverse floater positions.
What are IO and PO strips?
Interest-only (IO) strips receive only the interest portion of mortgage payments, while principal-only (PO) strips receive only the principal portion at a deep discount. IO strips have negative effective duration, meaning their value moves in the opposite direction of most bonds. When rates fall and prepayments accelerate, IO strip values decline sharply as the income stream evaporates. PO strips have very high positive duration and are extremely rate-sensitive. Both are institutional hedging tools that are generally unsuitable for retail investors seeking income or capital preservation.
Are MBS or CMOs FDIC insured?
No. MBS and CMOs are not FDIC insured under any circumstances. FDIC insurance covers deposits at insured banks—such as checking accounts, savings accounts, and certificates of deposit—but does not cover investment products, even if those products were purchased through a broker operating at an insured bank. The government backing on agency MBS protects against borrower default but does not protect against market value losses. SIPC coverage (up to $500,000) protects against broker-dealer insolvency, not investment losses.
What is prepayment risk, and how does it affect MBS investors?
Prepayment risk is the possibility that homeowners will pay off their mortgages early, typically by refinancing when interest rates fall. When this happens, MBS investors receive their principal back sooner than expected and must reinvest at lower rates. For investors who paid a premium (above face value) for their MBS, prepayments also generate direct losses because principal is returned at par. The related concept of extension risk is the opposite: when rates rise, homeowners stop refinancing, prepayments slow, and the investor is stuck holding a below-market-rate investment for much longer than anticipated.
How can I tell if my MBS or CMO recommendation was unsuitable?
Key indicators include: your broker described the product as “safe” or compared it to a CD; a large percentage of your portfolio was concentrated in MBS or CMOs; the investment’s time horizon did not match your age and income needs; your broker did not explain prepayment risk, extension risk, credit risk, or liquidity risk; the product was purchased on margin; or your broker could not explain how the product worked in plain language. If any of these apply, you should consult a securities attorney to evaluate whether you have a viable claim.
What is the statute of limitations for MBS fraud claims?
FINRA arbitration claims are generally subject to a six-year eligibility rule measured from the date of the event giving rise to the dispute. State securities statutes and common law claims may have shorter limitation periods. Because the clock begins running from the occurrence of the event (not necessarily from when the investor discovers the fraud), it is critical to consult an attorney as soon as you suspect losses may have resulted from unsuitable recommendations.
Can I file a claim if my losses occurred through an MBS mutual fund rather than a direct CMO purchase?
Potentially, yes. If your broker recommended an MBS-focused mutual fund that was unsuitable for your investment objectives and risk tolerance, you may have a viable claim for unsuitability, misrepresentation, or failure to supervise—the same theories that apply to direct CMO purchases. The Macquarie case, where the SEC imposed $79.8 million in penalties for CMO overvaluation affecting retail mutual fund investors, demonstrates that fund-level MBS misconduct can and does harm individual investors.
Contact an Experienced MBS Fraud Attorney
If you lost money in mortgage-backed securities, collateralized mortgage obligations, or any complex structured product that was unsuitable for your investment objectives, you may have a right to recover those losses. Attorney Robert Wayne Pearce has spent over 45 years fighting for defrauded investors in FINRA arbitration and securities litigation nationwide. His firm has recovered over $185 million for investors and represents clients on a contingency fee basis—meaning you pay nothing unless you recover.
The Law Offices of Robert Wayne Pearce, P.A. handles MBS fraud cases involving unsuitability, misrepresentation, failure to supervise, overconcentration, breach of fiduciary duty, elder financial abuse, and Regulation Best Interest violations. Whether your losses involve individual CMO tranches, MBS mutual funds, or private-label mortgage-backed products, Attorney Pearce has the experience and resources to evaluate your claim and pursue the maximum recovery available.
Call (561) 338-0037 for a free consultation, or visit secatty.com to submit your case for review.
The Law Offices of Robert Wayne Pearce, P.A.
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